Non-Human Identity Security: Why Machine Accounts Are Becoming a Major Cybersecurity Priority

Last Updated on September 16, 2026 by Michael Motha

Modern cybersecurity has spent years focusing on protecting people: employees, administrators, customers and contractors. But the digital systems those people use increasingly depend on another category of identity that rarely receives the same attention — identities belonging to software, applications, services, APIs, devices and automated processes.

These identities are commonly described as non-human identities, or NHIs.

They can authenticate to databases, cloud platforms, applications and internal systems without a person sitting behind every transaction. As businesses expand their use of cloud infrastructure, DevOps pipelines, APIs, automation and connected services, the number of machine identities can grow rapidly.

That creates a difficult security question: who is responsible for identities that do not belong to people?

The issue is becoming more visible across the cybersecurity industry. OWASP maintains a dedicated Non-Human Identities Top 10 project covering risks such as secret leakage, overprivileged identities, improper offboarding, insecure authentication and identity reuse.

For businesses, the challenge is no longer simply creating machine accounts. It is knowing what they can access, why they exist, whether they are still required and what happens if their credentials are compromised.

Cybersecurity Snapshot

• Non-human identities include service accounts, applications, APIs, workloads, automation and machine credentials.
• They can access sensitive systems without traditional human authentication workflows.
• Long-lived secrets and excessive permissions can turn forgotten machine accounts into security weaknesses.
• Cloud migration and software automation are increasing the number of machine-to-machine connections.
• Security teams need inventories, lifecycle controls, least-privilege permissions and continuous monitoring.
• Microsoft Entra Workload ID distinguishes workload identities from human identities and provides controls for applications, service principals and managed identities.
• OWASP’s NHI Top 10 provides a practical framework for identifying common risks.
• The future of identity security will increasingly include both human and machine identities.

What Are Non-Human Identities?

A non-human identity is a digital identity used by something other than a person to authenticate and obtain access to another system.

That could be a software application connecting to a database, a service communicating with another service, an automated deployment pipeline accessing cloud infrastructure or an API using a token to authenticate a request.

The category is broader than the traditional idea of a “service account.”

OWASP describes NHIs as identities used to identify, authenticate and authorize software entities such as applications, workloads, APIs, bots and automated systems.

Common examples include:

• Service accounts
• Application identities
• API keys
• Access tokens
• Service principals
• Managed identities
• Workload identities
• Automated deployment credentials
• Device and IoT identities
• Certificates used for machine authentication

These identities are essential to modern software.

A cloud application might need permission to retrieve data from storage. A deployment system may need access to publish a new application. A monitoring service may need permission to collect system information.

The technology cannot function without identities.

The security problem begins when organisations lose track of those identities.

The issue is becoming more visible across the cybersecurity industry through the OWASP Non-Human Identities Top 10, which examines risks including secret leakage, overprivileged identities and improper offboarding

Why Machine Identities Are Growing So Quickly

The traditional enterprise network had a relatively understandable identity structure.

Employees had accounts. Administrators had privileged accounts. Customers had application accounts.

Modern software architecture is considerably more interconnected.

Applications communicate with APIs. APIs connect to other services. Containers access cloud resources. CI/CD systems deploy applications automatically. Microservices communicate continuously. SaaS platforms exchange data through integrations.

Every connection can require authentication.

As a result, an organisation can have far more machine identities than employees.

Microsoft’s current documentation explicitly separates human identities from machine or non-human identities, with workload identities covering software such as applications, services, scripts and containers.

This creates a major management challenge.

A company may know exactly who its employees are while having limited visibility into hundreds or thousands of application credentials created over several years.

Some may belong to systems that are no longer actively used.

Others may have permissions that were necessary when they were created but are excessive today.

The Hidden Problem With Forgotten Service Accounts

One of the most dangerous characteristics of machine identities is that they can remain active long after their original purpose has disappeared.

Consider a development project that creates a service account to connect an application to a database.

The project ends.

The application is replaced.

The employee who created the account moves to another role.

But the service account remains.

If its credentials are still valid and its permissions have not been removed, the identity represents an access path that may no longer have a legitimate business purpose.

This is why lifecycle management matters.

OWASP specifically identifies improper offboarding as an NHI risk because unused identities and their associated credentials can remain exploitable after the underlying service is no longer required.

The lesson is straightforward: deleting an application is not necessarily the same thing as deleting every identity associated with it.

Long-Lived Secrets Create a Persistent Risk

Passwords are not the only credentials that need protection.

API keys, client secrets, certificates and access tokens can also become security liabilities when they are stored insecurely or remain valid for too long.

A credential embedded in source code can potentially expose access to another system.

A key stored in an unprotected configuration file can become available to anyone who gains access to that environment.

A credential shared between several applications creates an even larger problem because compromising one application could provide access to multiple systems.

OWASP’s NHI guidance specifically identifies secret leakage and long-lived secrets among the major risks associated with machine identities.

This is one reason modern identity architectures increasingly favour short-lived credentials, federation and managed identity approaches where practical.

Why Least Privilege Matters Even More for Machines

The principle of least privilege is simple: an identity should have only the permissions it actually needs.

For human users, excessive privileges are already a security concern.

For machines, the problem can be harder to detect because an automated identity may perform the same task thousands of times without human intervention.

A service account that can read one database does not necessarily need administrator access across an entire cloud environment.

An automated deployment system may need permission to deploy applications but not to access customer financial records.

A monitoring service may need to read infrastructure information without having permission to modify production systems.

Reducing unnecessary permissions limits the potential impact if a credential is compromised.

Microsoft’s current workload identity guidance includes controls for managing permissions, reviewing service principals and applying security policies to workload identities.

Non-Human Identity Security Is Not the Same as Password Security

It is tempting to treat machine credentials as simply another type of password.

That approach can create gaps.

Human identities normally have an owner.

Employees join organisations, change roles and eventually leave. Their access can therefore be connected to an employment lifecycle.

A machine identity may not have an obvious owner.

Its “owner” could be an application, development team, cloud resource or automated pipeline.

This means businesses need to connect technical identities with business ownership.

Security teams should be able to answer basic questions such as:

Who owns this identity?

What system uses it?

What resources can it access?

When was it last used?

How is it authenticated?

When should it expire?

What happens if the underlying application is retired?

Without those answers, an organisation can have a large identity inventory without genuine control over it.

The Shift Toward Workload Identity

Modern cloud platforms are increasingly moving away from manually managed credentials toward workload identity systems.

The basic idea is to give a workload an identity that can be authenticated and authorised without requiring developers to distribute permanent secrets.

Microsoft Entra, for example, supports managed identities and service principals for workloads. Managed identities can allow supported Azure resources to authenticate without developers having to manage credentials themselves.

This does not eliminate identity risk.

It changes how that risk is managed.

Instead of asking developers to protect another password or secret, the platform can provide mechanisms for identity assignment, authentication, permissions and lifecycle management.

For enterprises operating large cloud environments, this can significantly simplify machine-to-machine security.

Microsoft’s current Microsoft Entra Workload ID documentation provides specific guidance for securing applications, service principals and managed identities.

Why Identity Sprawl Could Become a Bigger Problem

Identity sprawl is not limited to employee accounts.

Every new application, integration, cloud service and automation workflow can introduce additional machine identities.

The problem becomes particularly complicated after years of digital transformation.

Businesses may have accumulated identities from:

• Legacy applications
• Cloud migrations
• Development environments
• Testing systems
• SaaS integrations
• CI/CD pipelines
• API integrations
• Data platforms
• Monitoring tools
• IoT deployments

The result can be a large collection of credentials whose original purpose is difficult to determine.

This is where non-human identity management starts becoming an enterprise governance issue rather than simply an IT administration task.

Organisations need to understand not just how many identities exist, but how those identities connect to critical systems.

Microsoft’s guidance for securing cloud-based service accounts recommends managed identities where appropriate and explains how service principals can represent applications and services.

The Connection Between NHI Security and Observability

Security teams also need visibility into how machine identities behave.

An identity that normally accesses one database but suddenly begins accessing several unrelated systems may deserve investigation.

Likewise, a service account that has been inactive for months but suddenly becomes active could represent an important security signal.

This is where identity security and observability begin to overlap.

TechKip’s recent analysis of observability software and digital visibility examined how businesses can connect telemetry across applications and infrastructure.

For NHI security, similar visibility can help organisations understand authentication activity, access patterns and unexpected changes across complex digital environments.

Observability does not replace identity security, but the two disciplines can reinforce each other.

Why NHI Security Should Include Software Development

Machine identities are often created during software development.

Developers may create application credentials, API integrations and deployment permissions as part of building a system.

That means cybersecurity cannot begin only after an application reaches production.

Identity controls should be considered during development.

Secrets should not be casually embedded into source code.

Development, testing and production environments should not automatically share the same identities.

Credentials should have appropriate lifetimes.

Permissions should be reviewed when applications change.

OWASP specifically identifies environment isolation and NHI reuse as risks, highlighting the danger of using the same machine identity across multiple environments or systems.

This makes NHI security part of secure software development rather than a separate security exercise.

The Importance of Inventory and Ownership

The first practical step for many organisations is simply creating an accurate inventory.

Security teams should attempt to identify:

• Every service account
• Every application identity
• Every privileged service principal
• Every API key
• Every long-lived credential
• Every machine certificate
• Every workload identity
• Every third-party integration

But inventory alone is not enough.

Each identity should also have an owner and a documented purpose.

If an organisation cannot explain why an identity exists, that identity should receive additional scrutiny.

This creates a useful principle for enterprise security:

An identity without an owner is an identity without clear accountability.

The same broader identity-protection challenge is visible in AI-powered scams, where compromised credentials and convincing social engineering can be combined.

Automation Can Help Manage Machine Identities

Managing thousands of identities manually is unlikely to scale.

Automation can help with credential rotation, access reviews, expiration policies, unused-account detection and policy enforcement.

Modern identity platforms are already adding capabilities around workload identity lifecycle management, federation and risk controls. Microsoft’s Workload ID documentation, for example, includes capabilities for removing unused applications and credentials, reviewing service principals and securing workload identities.

Automation should nevertheless be governed carefully.

A system that automatically changes permissions without understanding business dependencies could create operational problems.

The goal should be controlled automation: machines handle repetitive identity-management tasks while security teams retain oversight of important decisions.

Why Passkeys Do Not Solve This Problem

The growth of passkeys is an important development in human authentication.

TechKip recently examined how passkeys are becoming a new security standard while also noting that passwordless authentication does not eliminate every surrounding security risk.

But passkeys primarily address human authentication.

They do not automatically solve the problem of applications authenticating to other applications.

A company can deploy passkeys across its workforce and still have thousands of API keys, service principals, certificates and workload identities operating behind the scenes.

That distinction will become increasingly important.

Identity security needs to evolve beyond protecting employees alone.

NHI Security and the Broader Cybersecurity Strategy

Machine identity security should not operate as an isolated project.

It connects with several established cybersecurity disciplines.

Access management determines what identities can reach.

Secrets management protects credentials.

Cloud security controls workload permissions.

Application security protects the software creating and using identities.

Observability helps detect unusual behaviour.

Incident response determines what happens when an identity is compromised.

This interconnected model is becoming increasingly important as digital environments become more distributed.

TechKip’s previous coverage of AI identity protection and the future of cybersecurity explored the broader movement toward continuous identity-aware protection.

The next step is extending that thinking to the machines operating alongside people.

Organisations should also treat machine identity security as part of the wider discipline of software updates and vulnerability management.

NIST’s Identity and Access Management work reinforces the broader principle that organisations need to ensure the right entities have the right access to the right resources at the right time.

A Practical NHI Security Checklist

Businesses looking to strengthen machine identity security can begin with a relatively straightforward framework.

1. Build a Complete Inventory

Identify service accounts, API keys, application identities, workload identities, certificates and other machine credentials.

2. Assign Ownership

Every important identity should have a responsible team or business owner.

3. Remove Unused Identities

Old applications and retired integrations should trigger identity cleanup.

4. Reduce Permissions

Apply least privilege and remove access that is no longer required.

5. Replace Long-Lived Secrets

Where supported, consider managed identities, federation or short-lived credentials.

6. Separate Environments

Do not automatically reuse production identities in development or testing environments.

7. Monitor Activity

Look for unusual authentication behaviour, unexpected access and dormant identities suddenly becoming active.

8. Review Third-Party Access

External applications and integrations should receive only the permissions necessary for their purpose.

9. Automate Routine Controls

Use automation for credential rotation, expiration, inventory updates and access reviews where appropriate.

10. Test the Response

Security teams should know what happens when a machine credential is compromised and how quickly it can be revoked.

Industry Outlook

Non-human identity security is likely to become a larger part of enterprise cybersecurity as software becomes more interconnected.

The growth of APIs, cloud workloads, automation, DevOps, SaaS integrations and connected devices means organisations are creating more machine-to-machine relationships than traditional identity programmes were designed to handle.

The emergence of dedicated industry frameworks is an important signal. OWASP’s NHI Top 10 provides security teams with a structured way to examine risks such as improper offboarding, secret leakage, overprivileged identities, insecure cloud configurations and identity reuse.

The direction is also visible in major identity platforms. Microsoft now treats workload identities as a distinct security category and provides controls designed specifically for applications, service principals and managed identities.

The likely long-term change is conceptual.

Identity security will increasingly mean securing every entity that can access a system — not only every person who can log in.

TechKip Perspective

Cybersecurity teams have traditionally asked a straightforward question:

“Who has access?”

That question is no longer sufficient.

Modern organisations also need to ask:

“What software has access?”

“Which services can communicate with each other?”

“Which machine identities are privileged?”

“Which credentials have not been used recently?”

“Who owns them?”

“What happens when an application is retired?”

These questions may become increasingly important as businesses build more automated and interconnected technology environments.

Non-human identities are not inherently dangerous. They are essential components of modern digital infrastructure.

The risk comes from treating them as invisible.

TechKip’s view is that NHI security will increasingly become a standard part of enterprise identity governance rather than a specialist concern reserved for cloud engineers and security teams.

The organisations that understand their machine identities, control their permissions and continuously review their lifecycle will have a clearer security picture than organisations that focus exclusively on employee accounts.

The next generation of identity security will therefore not be human-only.

It will be about securing the entire digital workforce — people, applications, services and machines.

Frequently Asked Questions